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The Politics of Peace


The Politics of Peace Author(s): Kenneth N. Waltz Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Sep., 1967), pp. 199-211 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013947 Accessed: 08/11/2010 15:29
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of ThePolitics Peace*
KENNETH N. WALTZ
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY

of characteristicsworldpolitics The striking sincethewar have been these: peace amongthe powerful; theiroccasionaluse of war at timeswithinand amongthe weak; forceagainstothers; thefailure suchforceas has been used to lead to widerwars of at higher levelsof violence. one measures If timefrom termithe nation wars,1967 standsto 1945 as 1940 does to 1918.Never of in thiscentury have so manyyears gone by without the great a powers fighting generalwar. Small wars have been numerous, but somehow and limited. violencehas been controlled Despite a dreadful dangers, relative How has peace peace has prevailed. been prolonged and what are the prospectsof extending our blessings? "The end of the Cold War" is an emergent themeof political and studies, thosewho proclaim demiseusuallydo so witha its I sighof relief. am tempted predict, to that in the perversely, of coming yearsstudents politicswill look back on the era of the Cold War, if indeed it has ended, with the nostalgiathat historians longfeltfornineteenth-century have diplomatic Europe. Onlyfour yearsago it was written "The West,insteadof that dealingwithRussia in termsof a worldpolicy,persists the in attempt deal withthe worldin terms a Russianpolicy, to of this being in essence the policy of containing Russia all over the
* Thisis a revised version a paperdelivered a conference "The Reof at on quirements Peace" at the University New Hampshire, of of March 31-April 1, 1967.

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This is a fair deworld. The underlyingorientationis faulty."l1 scriptionand a false judgment. The United States did fashion and follow a "Russian" foreignpolicy. We have been willing to act or to support the action of others in order to counter the outward thrust of the Soviet Union and associated states: for example,in Greece, Berlin,Korea, and Cuba. We were not willing to supportthe Dutch in Indonesia in 1946 and 1962, the British and French in Suez in 1956, or the French in Indochina in the springof 1954. The Americanpursuitof a "Russian" foreignpolicy was not an error; it was instead the reversal of old and erroneous American habits. America's mistake prior to two world wars lay not in her failure to pay attentionto little states but in her disregardof the course of great-powerrelations.Interests have to be guarded where they exist in greatest magnitude, as in Western Europe; threatshave to be met when they emanate from a state whose strengthmay endanger one's own security. and other capabilities,the Soviet Union-and only By her military the Soviet Union-has constitutedsuch a threat. In sensible response, America pursued a "Russian" foreignpolicy; and the reverse can be said of the Soviet Union. The term "bloc" at times misled us, both because we exaggerated the likely coherence of the two blocs and because we theirmeaning.Associated states added littleif anymisunderstood thing to the strengthof the respective bloc leaders; each bloc was an extensionof the leader's power. Antagonismbetween the United States and the Soviet Union shaped the politics of peace in the period that began with the conclusionof the Second World War. The stark dangers of a nuclear world and the simplicity of relations between two powerful adversaries produced clarity Each can lose heavily of in the definition theirnational interests. only in war with the other; in power and in wealth, both can gain more by the peaceful development of internal resources and subduing-other than by wooing and winning-or by fighting states in the world. A five per cent growth rate sustained for three years adds to the American gross national product an amount greaterthan the entire gross national product of Britain or France or West Germany or Japan. Whether measured in terms,the distance in power between the economicor in military superpowersand any other state has enabled the United States
1 RobertC. Tucker,The Soviet PoliticalMind: Studies in Stalinism and 1963), p. 183. Change (New York:Praeger, Post-Stalin

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and the SovietUnionto pursuetheirown interests without adjusting their strategies thefearsand wishesof associated to states. The UnitedStatesand the SovietUnion influence each other morethananyof the states living their in penumbra possibly can hope to do. In the last analysis, what the UnitedStateshad to do in the worldwas determined by calculation how to not of gain new allies or please old ones, but by gaugingthe power and disposition the SovietUnion.In a hot war or a cold war of -as in any close competition-the external situation dominates. In the middle1950's,JohnFosterDulles inveighed againstthe immoral neutralists. Russian and Chinese leaders,at the same time and in similarspirit, describedneutralists eitherfools as themselves dupes of capitalist or countries. ideology But did not longprevail overinterest. BothRussiaand America quickly came to acceptneutralist statesand even to lend themencouragement. The Soviet Union aided Egypt and Iraq, countries that kept theircommunists jail. From 1957 onward, in the United States, whichhad alreadygiven much assistance Communist to Yugoslavia,made neutralist India the mostfavored aid recipients. of to According the rhetoric the Cold War, the rootcleavage of in theworldwas betweencapitalist and democracy godlesscommunism. by the size of the stakesand the forceof the strugBut gle, ideologywas subordinated interest the policies of to in Americaand Russia, who behaved more like traditional great powersthanlike leadersof messianic In movements. a worldin whichtwo statesunited in theirmutual antagonism overfar shadowany other, incentives a calculatedresponsestand the to out mostclearly, and the sanctions behavior againstirresponsible achievetheir greatest force. Thus two states, isolationist tradiby in tion, untutored the ways of international and relations, famed forimpulsive behavior, soon showedthemselves-not alwaysand but everywhere, alwaysin crucialcases-to be wary,alert,cautious,flexible, forbearing. and Some have believed that a new world began with the explosionof an atomicbomb over Hiroshima. shapingthe beIn havior nations, perennial of the forces politics as important of are as the new military technology. States remainthe primary vehiclesof ideology. The internationalist brotherhood autocrats of after1815,the cosmopolitan liberalism the middlenineteenth of international century, socialism before WorldWar I, international in communism the decades following Bolshevik the revolution-

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were capturedby movements in all of thesecases international adherents the creedwere harnessed the of to individual nations, were manipulated nanation's interest, international programs by and tional governments, ideologybecame a prop to national and AmeribecameRussian, policy.So the SovietUnionin crisis and can policy,liberal rhetoric aside, came to be realistically constructed. the forceof events, cautiously By theyand we were to constrained behave in ways belied both by theirwordsand ours. Such were the healthful as effects the Cold War, defined of the approximate balance of the two mostpowerful states, whose interactions formed politics peace.*" If,however, world the of the balancehas now tiltedin America's favor, thendomestic aspects of foreign policy become more important the studyof the in politicsof peace. II Partlyfor reasonsof policy and partlybecause changesin have latelybeen less rapid and far-reaching, military technology the United States in the past half-dozen years has converted economicresources into military superior capabilityat a pace thatthe SovietUnion apparently not matched.Close comhas subordinates to petition ideology interest; statesthatenjoya margin of power over their closest competitors more readily can that reach pursuetheirfanciesabroad and indulgeaspirations in beyondthe fulfillment interests of defined termsof narrowly security. Deterrencethat rests on second-strike forces makes smallwars safeby diminishing chancesof uncontrolled the escalation.The possibilities action,by military of and othermeans, are thusmade large forany statethat disposesof a surplusof power.Undersuchcircumstances, national impulses shapeforeign than prevailswhen power is more policywith lesserconstraint evenlybalanced. conditions Habits shaped by international may continueto a inform nation's have changed. The policyevenwhenconditions has United States,once reflexively isolationist, become almost Wherewe once assumedthatchanges internationalist. reflexively of in the configuration worldpower were of no interest us, to we now behave as thoughany of many eventsin the world
* * This is notthe usual definition "Cold War"; it is the mostusefulone of bothforunderstanding events and forgauging future past possibilities.

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withAmerican formustelicitour vigorous response. Moreover, eign policyless closelyguidedby the Russiandanger, impulses frozen the Cold War maythawout in today's by warmer climate and lead to unfortunate actions.When foreign dangersare less pressing, moreattention mustbe paid to nationalinclinations. in Herbert Hooverand WoodrowWilson,whose preferences illusforeign policymoved in oppositedirections, nevertheless tratea basic qualityof American thinking. The one foundevil rifein theworldand would have had us insulate ourselves from it; the otheragreed about the unsatisfactory condition the of worldand would have had us act to changeit. In the foreign policyof the country since the Second World War, the latter tendency not been absent. has An imbalance international forcesmay give one state the of with othersto opportunity dominate, singlyor in combination the use of power by thatis, to use its own power to control otherstates.At timesthis has been the half-articulated dream it of American of policy.One critichas discerned in the threat massiveretaliation, messageconveyed the being: cross the line we have drawn-or, moregeneralterms, in violatethe ruleswe have laid down-and you will be erased.2Not so long ago, Senator WilliamFulbright, J. along with otherartificers an of Atlantic imperium, aspired to a condition world hegemony of thatwould providethe material basis for managing the world. 'If the West goes on to realizeits fullest possiblestrength an in Atlantic partnership, can," the Senatorwrote,"bringabout a it in decisiveshift the world balance of power and permanently foreclose the possibility significant of Communist expansion."3 President Kennedy, speakingon the Fourthof July,1962, rethat:"Acting our own by ourselves, cannotestabmarked on we lishjusticethroughout world.We cannotinsureits domestic the tranquility, providefor its commondefense, promoteits or or or generalwelfare, secure the blessingsof liberty ourselves to and our posterity. joinedwithotherfreenations, can do But we all this and more.. We can mount a deterrent powerful enoughto deter any aggression, and ultimately can help we achievea worldof law and freechoice,banishing worldof the
2 Robert W. Tucker,The JustWar: A Studyin Contemporary American Doctrine (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,1960), pp. 190-193. 3 J. WilliamFulbright, Prospects the West (Cambridge:HarvardUnifor versity Press,1963), p. 27.

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war and coercion."4Such would be the benefitsof an AmericanEuropean union. Put more simply in the down-to-earth prose of is PresidentJohnson:the purpose of American militarystrength A "to put an end to conflict."5 continuous strand in American thinkingruns from Presidents Wilson and Hoover to President Johnson-ifwe cannot insulate ourselves from the world, then we should seek to control it.f of The humane rhetoricand obvious good intention the above statementsdisguise what should worry us greatly. One cannot assume that the leaders of a nation superiorin power will always definepolicies with wisdom, devise tactics with fine calculation, and apply force with forbearance.The possession of great power has often tempted nations to the unnecessary and foolish employment of force. For one state or combination of states to forecloseothers'use of force in a world in which grievancesand disputes abound, to end conflictin a contentiousworld, would require as much wisdom as power. Since justice cannot be objectivelydefined, the temptation the powerfulnation is to claim of thatthe solutionit seeks to impose is a just one. Illustrations dismayingly are abundant. For example,in Senator Edward W. Brooke'smaiden speech to the Senate, he first defined the question of justifying our presence in Vietnam as academic and then went on to resolve that issue. The developmentof his logic well illustrates what scares me. This is what he said: "Once we . . . begin to rationalize the strugglein Vietnam as a necessary sacrificeto the global balance of power, I believe that we cross the line between a just and an unjust war. While we may recognizethe wider implicationsof the war, we can never justify the conflict those grounds.In my judgmentit would be plainly on immoralto expect the South Vietnameseto suffer today's violence war somewhereelse."6 in order to ward offtomorrow's We fight not to ward offa bigger war but, again in the words of SenatorBrooke,to secure what is "best for South Vietnam,and mosthonorable and decent for ourselves."This is apparentlytrue;
4 "The Goal of an Atlantic Kennedy," Addressby President Partnership: Vol. XLVII, No. 1204 (July 23, 1962), of The Department State Bulletin,

r)"Excerpts FromSpeech to Coast Guard,"New YorkTimes,June4, 1964. One thatthisis uniquelyan American way of thinking. f I do not contend nations. withRussiaand withmanyother drawcomparisons might 6 "Reporton Vietnamand East Asia." Reprinted fromthe Congressional Record(March23, 1967), p. 8.

p. 133.

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out of necessity.Spokesmenforthe Adminwe surelydo not fight istrationhave asserted the vital importanceof showing that insurgenciesare costly,damaging,and doomed to defeat; theyhave argued that one setback may lead to another; they have averred that China mustbe containedfor a time as the Soviet Union was earlier. A strong case, however, cannot result from adding up weak reasons.The revolutionary guerrillawins civil wars, not internationalones, and no civil war can change the balance of world power unless it takes place in America or Russia. In any event, the potency of irregularwarfare and the ability of communiststo bore from within have been grossly exaggerated-as the recordof eventsin Greece, Malaya, the Philippines,Laos, and Indonesia makes clear. Nor does one setback necessarilylead to another.We are misled by the vision of dominoes. States in the lack the solidity, area of the fighting shape, and cohesion that the image suggests.Externallyill-defined, internally fragile and chacall to mind sponges; and sponges, otic, theymore appropriately whatevertheirother characteristics, not fromthe transmission do of impulsesneatly fall down in a row. As for China, mesmerized by the magic of mere numbers,we have led ourselves to believe that800 millionpeople mustbe able to do something highlydamaging to somebody. They have in fact hardly been able to do at anything all; and any increase in Chinese strength would anyway be first and foremosta worryfor the Soviet Union, not for the United States. The term"bloc" has falleninto desuetude; instead it is the term that "polycentrism" now misleadsus. Though the communist movement is no longer effectively directed by the Soviet Union, we still think in terms of an internationalconspiracy and talk as thoughinterestand duty require us to counter its machinations. It can, however,no longer be said that a communistgovernment newly come to power in some minor state will enhance Russia's or strength somehow add to the power of a now mythicalworld communist movement.Nor can we believe, if we look at Eastern enslaves a Europe, that the triumphof communismpermanently people. Let us be blunt. Who will say for sure that Ho Chi Minh and his associates are the worst of the possible futurerulers of Vietnam?And when I say "for sure," I mean with enough assurance to meritthe killingof some hundredsof thousandsof people over the issue. The United States has been able to commitnearly500,000 men

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withno increase thepercentage grossnain of to warin Vietnam that goes into defenseand no weakening our of tionalproduct the strategic position vis-a-vis SovietUnion.Withsuchvast capathe but the bility, UnitedStatescan act,notagainst SovietUnion, the threat that her power entails.SenatorBrookeis aside from not for indeedright. We do not fight our interest; enoughis at into question.We American interests stake to bringimportant as for mustthenbe fighting such abstractions honorand decency else's welfareas we see it. and on behalfof somebody of A statethatenjoysa margin powerin its favoris able to to make choices.It can seek to bringorderly government those to to unableto govern themselves, givefreedom peoplewhoseunmakethemunableto use it; happyhistory present and condition and seek to build it can kill people in the name of theirliberty a polity by and shape a society the use of B-52's. But whichis the better basis of policy-tokillpeople in order for war onlyout of apprehension to freethem, to undertake or from one'sown security? first The to amounts deducing necessity a liberalprinciple7 wrapping mantleof justicearounda the and the nationalcause in orderto legitimate bloodshed.The second dictatesand eschewing force amounts doing what necessity to in exceptwhere vital interest dictatesits use. If developments disVietnammightindeed tilt the world balance in America's logic But Brooke's favor, thenwe oughtto be fighting. by Senator suchfighting If balanceofpower wouldbe immoral. thedominant in the world is not in question, But, then we need not fight. according SenatorBrooke,only under such a circumstance, to wherethe nationfighting can abroadhas risenabove its interest, what of warsbe considered on just.War undertaken calculations thesecurity thecountry of is requires said to be crassand narrowly selfish. "War is eithera crusade or a crime"is a slogan that idealists attractive. thecrusader, actson his definition find But who of another's crimesin the name of interest, may then commit century, has been said, it humanity. Statesmen the nineteenth of of the "fought 'necessary' wars and killedthousands; idealists the twentieth 'just'warsand kill millions."8 century fight of The perils of weaknessare matchedby the temptations power.Good intentions, backed by greatpower,have oftenled
7 Cf.Tu.cker, Just The War,pp. 20-21 . 8 A. J. P. Taylor,Rumoursof War (London: Hamish Hamilton,1952), p. 44. Taylor refers specifically Bismarck. to

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to persecution, unnecessary violence, and widespread destruction. The patternis uncomfortably common,whetherin the relation of believersto infidels, one race to another,or of nation to nation. of War is a blunt instrument. Once begun, it is hard to control. As more blood is spilled, more resoundingreasons must be given for the carnage untilfinally unimportant wars foughtfor doubtful causes are justified the name of high principle.The escalation in of justifications the war in Vietnam is as impressive as the in escalationof force-and may be ultimately dangerous.The loftier as the principlesinvoked,the more difficult becomes to stop the it war and disentanglethe nation. Given the luxuryof choice that vast power provides,the question of the criteriaof commitment, far frombeing academic, becomes vital. And if the restraints of international politics press less closely, the question of internal restraint looms ever larger. To study the politics of peace, then, requiresexamination domesticpolitics,especially the politics of of the world's most powerfulnation. III Democracies, and especially the American democracy, have oftenbeen thoughtdefectivein the makingand conduct of foreign policy. To maintainlarge foreign-aid programs,to sustain heavy defense spending in years of peace, to garrisonodd corners of the world,to fighton occasion in distantlands withoutprospect of tangiblegains-these tasks were thoughtto exceed the political capacityof the nation. They have all been steadily accomplished. Weaknesseswere thoughtto inhere in the structure Ameriof can politics;strengths were much underestimated. the American In of system government, political strugglesfor officeand arguments over policy take place among individuals and groups who openly clash and compete.Competitionamong interests and the clash of the perspectives that heightensissues and strengthens institutions is a political generalist, expressthem.The Congressman, who becomes an expert in one realm of policy or another in order to advance his career and forwardhis policy preferences. The executive official, who may be an expertin policy,schools himselfin the political arts in order to protecthis departmentand advance its The Americansystemis one of contention programs. among strong whose cutting edges have been honed in recurrent institutions conflict. Should one say then that the Presidentis weak because or Congress is strong, should one say that the American govern-

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ment is powerfulbecause its componentparts are stronglyconstitutedand active? Those who definepower according to differences in the amountof forcewielded by each of two entities-who thinkof power as a residue of strength-willsurely reply in the negative. It is, however,more useful to thinkof the power of a in government termsof its effectiveness. May it not be that the government gains power from the strengthof each of its component institutions? The strength the Presidencyfacilitatedthe remarkably of rapid and felicitousadjustmentof the nation to its postwar role in the world. But thereis no end to one's worries.In the 1950's we wondered whetherthe nation would support the waging of limited wars. We may now fear that the government unable to admit is its errorsand bring wars to an end when force has outrun its objectives. No governmentalsystem,however well constructed, can guarantee a satisfactory policy product. More than other systems,the Americangovernment providesopportunity leadership for combined with encouragement criticswho oppose the nation's to policy. Many Congressmen,powerful in their constituencies, are not easily amenable to the executive'swishes. Because opposition to the President'spolicy cannot bringthe government down, members of both parties are free to criticizeloudly. The presence of inquisitiveCongressmen gives dissidentexecutiveofficials chance a to express their misgivings.The investigationsof congressional committees provide private citizenswith a public platform. PresidentJohnson has shown an unusual abilityto keep issues fromoccurringin publicly conspicuclosed, to preventarguments ous places. The susceptibility the Presidentto criticism neverof is theless indicated by his efforts win over some critics and to to blanket the voices of others through skillfultiming of his own newsworthy activities. Though one would not expect Presidentsto admit it-or even to believe it-opposition to foreignpolicy may not only be permissible; it may even be a patrioticduty. Opposition in some ways makes the President'slife harder; in other ways, it improves his position. If one state is hard pressed by others, the wide and willingsupportof its people is needed. Though widespread support of leaders and their policies enhances the strength a state, it of for maneuver. Disalso decreases the government's opportunity sent frompolicy and oppositionto the actions of the government provide a chance for the President to choose among different

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try policies. Should we bomb morein Vietnam, harderto withdraw, or carryon as at present?If each option enjoys a fair amount of support,the Presidentcan more easily choose among them. By raising theirvoices, the criticshave helped to "maintainthe options"; they have not persuaded the President to make a more precise adjustmentof power to political purpose, nor are they likely to do so. A government's policy and its public standingare closely idenmore so in democraciesthan in otherpolitical systified, perhaps to tems.At thispoint,the relationof a government its policy must be considered with care. Two cases are especially instructive: first, the Korean War and the American election of 1952. The having begun the Korean War, was Democratic Administration, victory diplomaticsettlement. or unable to end it eitherby military A Presidentsteadilylosing public supportmay findhimselfboxed in, as to a considerableextentPresidentTruman did. Aftermonths withdrawalwould have been of inconclusiveand costly fighting, and to threatenthe use of unlimitedmeans in order humiliating, to achieve a limited end, as Eisenhower and Dulles did later, would have failed of acceptance at home and lacked credibility abroad. The Korean case is one in which the President and his closest advisers had failed to sustain the nation's confidencein if and competence. Under such circumstances, a their integrity made, change of persons and parties can be easily and gracefully policies that remain necessarythough they have become unpopular can more easily be continued.The election of 1952, by bringand success promotedthe continuity ing a change in government, of a policy. This is hardly what is wanted by the critics of America'spolicy in Vietnam. and makes a second comparison,another If one looks further emerges.France pursued a costly course, and one that possibility for sixteen years in Indochina and could never return a profit, Algeria.During the Fourth Republic, policy remained constantso of were formedby the shuffling partyleaders long as governments and groups,all of whom were deeply implicatedin old policies. It took exceptionalpolitical events,the emergenceof Mendes-France of and then of de Gaulle, to make the redirection policy possible. In the United States elections provide a routineway of changing Would-be leaders, parties,the cabinet, and many public officials. that they can do what present govcustomarily argue governors ernorscannot,whetherthis be to carryold programsto a success-

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ful conclusionor to contrivenew and betterpolicies. Any government that commitsitselfto a policy whose costs come to exceed will have trouble admittingits error.A governpossible benefits ment cannot reassess national interestsif its costly policies have been based on dramatic statementsof their importance.At the in same time, a government such a position appears to the adversaryas an unattractivenegotiatingpartner precisely because in its large investment war makes its acquiescence in a moderate Both forinternaland external settlement unlikely. reasons,a change of government facilitatesthe contrivanceand application of new In the years of the Korean War, it appeared that Russia and China united were bent upon extendingtheir sway. America resisted for the sake of her futuresecurity.Now, with communist nations in disarray,America's war in Southeast Asia threatensto Russian or Chinese military heal communist to interrifts, call forth vention,and to destroyNorth Vietnam's ability to resist Chinese control.Continued fighting works against American interestsand seems to have only the purpose of determining who shall misrule Vietnam next. To settle on almost any terms available is the course that wisdom would dictate. In American domesticpolitics, a new governmentwould have more to gain by concluding a peace than by waging General William C. Westmoreland's"war of attrition" with all of its costs and attendantrisks.9One cannot predictthat a new Presidentwould seek to disentanglethe nation more earnestlythan President Johnsonhas done; one can only say that a new Presidentwould be freerto do so. The criticsof American policy in Vietnam help to make a policy of disentanglement possible. They widen the range of choices, especially forthe next government which theymay help to bringinto power.
policies.

IV
If the United States is militarily powerfulthat we need not so at the momentfollow a "Russian" foreignpolicy but instead are free to pursue peripheral objectives in Asia, then, by the same logic, the oppositionis free to oppose that policy withoutearning the charge of seriouslyweakeningthe nation. Strongnationshave oftenabused their power to the detriment themselvesand of of others.A nation as powerful as America may become impatient
9 See "Textof Westmoreland's Addressat A.P. Meetingand of His Replies to Questions," New YorkTimes, April25, 1967.

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with the defensivepose it has struckand long maintained.Senator Fulbright, frightened the temptations by posed by the plenitude of power thathe once hoped we would generate,has warned that overextension power of us against "that fatal presumption, and mission, which broughtruin to ancient Athens,to Napoleonic France and to Nazi Germany."He has cautioned his countrynot to become "what it is not now and never has been, a seeker after unlimitedpower and empire.""' Two dangers now threatenespecially. With multiplicationof it to the arenas of major contention, will become more difficult rememberthat American security interestsrequire militaryenthat he gagementsonly where the adversaryis of such strength is or may become a threatto the nation. Beyond that,thoughthe marginof power that America enjoys over any other contender may be a source of comfortto her citizens, it may also worry the observer.The temptations power arise fromits surplus,and of that same surplusof power makes dissentat once acceptable and politicallyuseful. To a considerable extent,the restraintof the nation must now be self-imposed. The politics of peace is primarilythe internal and external politics of the powerful. We should not hastily assume that the Cold War has ended; the relation of underlyingantagonismbetween America and Russia will remain. This must be so since each is and will long continue to be the only state that can grievously damage the other. Substantial imbalance between the United States and the Soviet Union is not likely to endure, for especiallyin a two-party the laggard is stimulatedto competition increaseits efforts. the more so, then,we should pay attention All and most to the Soviet Union and not gear our actions to first waywardpolitical movements statesof minorconsequence. in
10 "Excerpts FromFulbright's Speech on Vietnam War," New YorkTimes, April29, 1966.


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